a b st r a c t Grammatical constructions are typically partially but not fully productive, which leads to a conundrum for the learner. When can a construction be extended for use with new words and when can it not? The solution suggested here relies on two complementary processes. The fi rst is dy na m i c c at e g o r i z at i o n : as learners record the statistics of their language, they implicitly categorize the input on the basis of form and function. On the basis of this categorization process, general semantic and phonological constraints on productivity emerge, and productivity is to a large extent determined by the degree to which the category is well attested by similar exemplars. Occasionally, a semantically sensical and phonologically well-formed instance of a well-attested construction is simply not fully acceptable. It is suggested that a process of stat i st i c a l p r e e m pt i o n is at work in these cases: learners avoid using a construction if an alternative formulation has been systematically witnessed instead. The mechanism proposed for statistical preemption is competition-driven learning: when two competitors are activated but one reliably wins, the loser becomes less accessible over time.
Introduction
A learner's goal is to understand intended messages given the particular forms that are witnessed for the sake of comprehension, and to choose particular forms, given the intended information she wishes to convey for the sake of production. Therefore it is clear that speakers must learn the g o l d b e r g ways in which forms and functions are paired in the languages they speak. These learned pairings of form and function are referred to here as c o n st r u c t i o n s . Constructions are understood to vary in their degree of complexity and abstraction, and to form an inter-related dynamic network of linguistic knowledge. A few English constructions are provided in Table 1 , along with exemplars of each, attested in the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA: Davies, 2008a ) . 1 The ability to cluster -dy na m i c a l ly c at e g o r i z e -witnessed exemplars into distributions of types is clearly ubiquitous in humans and throughout the animal kingdom. For example, the next door we encounter may diff er from previous doors in being larger or smaller, wooden or windowed, and may require pushing, pulling, or sliding to open. And yet we have no trouble recognizing a new door as a door; nor, fortunately, do we normally have trouble distinguishing doors from windows. We categorize linguistic elements as well (e.g., Kuhl, 2000 ; Lakoff , 1987 ; Langacker, 1987 ; Taylor, 2003 ) . As discussed below, each construction forms a category, and this allows us to apply our linguistic knowledge to new situations and experiences. That is, constructions are p r o d u c t i v e to varying degrees. A few examples of productive uses of familiar constructions (again labeled on the right) are provided in Table 2 . At the same time, the same constructions exemplifi ed in Tables 1 and 2 resist being used productively with certain other words, even when the intended meaning is perfectly clear and the examples do not violate systemwide semantic, syntactic, or phonological generalizations. Examples that illustrate the lack of full productivity are provided in Table 3 , along with related acceptable examples in parentheses.
Thus, constructions are typically partially productive in that they can be extended for use with some words ( Table 2 ) , but they are not necessarily completely productive, even when no general semantic, phonological, or syntactic constraints are violated ( Table 3 ). The present paper investigates the long-standing paradox that this partial productivity presents: How do learners know when and how far a given construction's productivity extends?
A good deal of work has demonstrated that the solution is non-trivial. Learners do not reliably receive overt corrections for ill-formed utterances, because people are much more interested in the content of a speaker's contribution than its form (Baker, 1979 ; Bowerman, 1988 Bowerman, , 1996 Braine, 1971 ; Brown & Hanlon, 1970 ; Marcus, 1993 ; Pinker, 1989 ) . That the words used 'fi t' the constraints on the construction is required, as explained in Section 2 (see also Ambridge, Pine, Rowland, Jones, & Clark, 2009 ; Coppock, 2008 ; Goldberg, 1995 ; Gropen, Pinker, Hollander, & Goldberg, 1991 ; Gropen, Pinker, Hollander, Goldberg, & Wilson, 1989 ; Pinker, 1989 ), but it is not suffi cient to insure acceptability, as illustrated in the examples in Table 3 . Positing underlying or invisible features does not address the learning issue, since doing so would beg the question of how it is that learners know to assign the relevant diacritics to some lexical items and not others (Ambridge, Pine, & Lieven, 2015 ; Goldberg, 2011b ; Pinker, 1989 , section 5.2) .
It is tempting to believe that speakers only use familiar words in the ways in which they have been witnessed, i.e., that speakers are wholly c o n s e r vat i v e (Baker, 1979 ; Braine & Brooks, 1995 ) . In line with this idea, it has been predicted that the more often a word is witnessed in one construction, the more diffi cult ta b l e 3. Novel formulations that are judged odd by native speakers Exemplar Construction (9) ??"She explained him the story." Double-object construction (cf. "She told/guaranteed him the story.") (10) ??"He vanished the rabbit."
Transitive causative construction (cf. "He banished the rabbit.") (11) ??"She considered to go."
To-infi nitival complement construction (cf. "She hoped/planned to go.") (12) ??"the asleep boy" Attributive modifi cation construction (cf. "the astute/sleeping boy") ta b l e 1.
Four English C O N S T R U C T I O N S (learned pairings of form and function) and exemplars of each from COCA

Exemplar Construction
(1) "Janson gave him a business card." Double-object construction (2) "We broke the shredder."
Transitive causative construction (3) "She had hoped to look enticing."
To-infi nitival complement construction (4) "the tall fi gure" Attributive modifi cation construction ta b l e 2.
Novel linguistic exemplars that demonstrate the P R O D U C T I V I T Y of various constructions
Exemplar Construction (5) "Hey man, bust me some fries." (Google) Double-object construction (6) "We were wardrobing her for her nightly chat show" (Google)
Transitive causative construction (7) it is to extend it for use in a diff erent construction (Ambridge et al., 2009 ; Stefanowitsch, 2008 ) . In fact, children are relatively more willing to overgeneralize infrequent verbs (e.g., to use vanish transitively) than to overgeneralize frequent verbs (e.g., to use disappear transitively) (Ambridge, Pine, & Rowland, 2012 ; Theakston, 2004 ) . The suggestion has been that this is due to the fact that disappear has been heard in the simple intransitive construction much more often than vanish , and that it is more diffi cult to creatively causativize because it is more entrenched intransitively. We revisit this fi nding in Section 3 . This proposal, which is referred to here as c o n s e r vat i v i s m v i a e n t r e n c h m e n t , faces a problem, because if learners only use predicates in ways in which they have already been witnessed, and if predicates more strongly resist novel uses for higher-frequency verbs, then the following attested examples ought to be quite ill-formed: Each of the verbs in (13)-(16) ( pray , cough , swim , snore) is very frequent ('entrenched') in the i n transitive construction, and only exceedingly rarely, if ever, witnessed in the various transitive constructions in (13)-(16). 2 And yet, although Robenalt and Goldberg ( 2015 ) fi nd that such novel sentences are in fact judged to be less acceptable than sentences in which the same verbs are used intransitively, they are not as ill-formed as the types of novel examples in Table 3 . Moreover, speakers readily extend verbs in new ways that have not been witnessed when the intended message is conveyed better by a diff erent construction (Perek & Goldberg, 2015 ) . Thus, the solution to the issue of partial productivity is not merely a matter of learners being conservative via entrenchment.
In the following sections, it is argued the solution follows from the fact that attested exemplars cluster together to form constructional categories, and that constructions can compete with one another in particular contexts. A concrete example may be helpful. If we learn that many varieties of leafy green vegetables are called lettuce , we are likely to label a new, only subtly diff erent, leafy green vegetable as lettuce as well. That is, if we know that a category is attested by a variety of exemplars, and a new exemplar is suffi ciently similar to attested instances, we are very likely to assign it to the same category. At the same time, if we hear a diff erent label, say kale, consistently assigned to a new type of leafy green vegetable in contexts in which we might have expected to hear lettuce , then we will learn that kale is not lettuce (see also Bowerman & Choi, 2003 ) . Briefl y, the analogy to syntactic productivity outlined in more detail below is as follows. A potential productive use of an existing construction (a new c o i na g e ) is acceptable to the extent that the extended category that includes previously attested examples and the potential coinage is well attested (i.e., is dense or well-c o v e r e d ). The idea that speakers generalize over attested exemplars suggests that semantic, pragmatic, and phonological constraints emerge, as exemplars that share the same surface form are categorized. For example, exemplars of the English double-object formal pattern construction will almost all share an implication of transfer from one entity to another, and they will almost always involve a more topical recipient argument and a more focal theme argument. As these exemplars are categorized as instances of the same construction, the well-known semantic and information structure constraints of the double-object construction will emerge.
At the same time, as we saw in Table 3 , there are certain formulations that are avoided by native speakers even though they seem to fi t within these types of emergent constraints. It is proposed that a new coinage will be inhibited to the extent that there already exists a readily available alternative formulation that serves the requisite function; in this case, the alternative will stat i st i c a l ly p r e e m pt the coinage. To return to our lettuce example, the category of lettuce is well attested by a variety of exemplars, all of which are leafy green vegetables. But, since a particular type of leafy green is consistently labeled kale in contexts where one might have expected to hear lettuce , people learn that that type of leafy green is kale and not lettuce. In Sections 2 and 3 , these two aspects of the proposal, coverage -which encourages productivity while capturing emergent semantic and phonological generalizations -and statistical preemptionwhich constrains productivity and accounts for the learning of seemingly arbitrary exceptions -are discussed in turn.
The r ange of gener alization is determined by
c ove r age Work by Suttle and Goldberg ( 2011 ) and Perek ( 2016 ) has argued that the critical factor in determining when a construction is productive is c o v e r a g e , an idea borrowed from the non-linguistic categorization literature (Goldberg, 2006 , p. 98; Osherson, Smith, Wilkie, Lopez, & Shafi r, 1990 ) . Coverage relates type frequency, variability, and similarity of the coinage to attested tokens: all factors that have been independently found to be relevant. The idea is depicted in Figure 1 . A new coinage is acceptable to the extent that the semantic (pragmatic, and/or phonological) space is well covered by the smallest convex category that encompasses both the coinage and attested instances that share the same formal pattern: the category is represented by the larger oval. Exemplars with shared form are represented in a high degree similarity space, projected here onto two dimensions for expository purposes. The degree of coverage corresponds to the degree to which the attested instances fi ll or 'cover' the entire category.
In a series of experiments performed using Amazon's Mechanical Turk, Suttle and Goldberg ( 2011 ) found that type frequency, variability of attested instances, and similarity of a target utterance to attested instances interact in ways that are predicted by the notion of coverage. The design of the experiment was as follows. We provided one to six attested utterances of a fi ctitious language, Zargotian, and then asked participants to judge how likely it was that a fi nal utterance would also be acceptable in Zargotian. As example stimulus trial is given below:
(17) Assume you can say these sentences.
Scrape -nu the vip the hap.
Load -nu the yib the vork. Flip -nu the loof the rolm. How likely is it, on a scale of 1-100, that you can also say: Rumple -nu the pheb the jirm.
We systematically varied (i) whether participants were given one, three, or six distinct attested exemplars (type frequency), (ii) the diversity of verb classes the exemplars were chosen from (variability), and (iii) the degree of similarity between the target utterance and its closest attested neighbor, as determined by Latent Semantic Analysis (Landauer, 2006 ) . Ten verb classes were varied across participants and items and included verbs of breaking, loading, bending, cooking, cutting, acquiring, throwing, hitting, holding, and cognition. The fi ndings confi rmed that when coverage is relatively high, a coinage is judged to be more acceptable. For example, in the situation depicted in Figure 2 , in which three attested examples come from diff erent verb classes and the potential coinage comes from yet a diff erent class, participants judged the potential coinage to be less acceptable than if type frequency was increased and all else was held constant (as depicted in Figure 3 ).
If a new coinage is suffi ciently semantically dissimilar so that coverage is again low, the coinage is judged less acceptable, even if the type frequency and variability of attested instances is relatively high (Suttle & Goldberg, 2011 , experiment 3) . This situation is depicted in Figure 4 (see also Barðdal, 2008 ; Bybee & Eddington, 2006 ; Croft & Cruse, 2004 ; Kalyan, 2012 ; Langacker, 1987 ; Wonnacott, Boyd, Thompson, & Goldberg, 2012 ; Zeschel & Bildhauer, 2009 The role of type frequency interacts with semantic similarity in the following way. If the potential coinage is semantically similar to a cluster of examples with high type frequency and high semantic similarity, then the coinage is likely to be judged quite acceptable. However, acceptability decreases as the semantic similarity of the potential coinage to the cluster decreases. Thus, a lack of semantic variability of attested tokens inhibits generalization if the potential coinage is not part of the same cluster of related tokens, as depicted in Figure 5 . This type of relationship between type frequency and variability has also been reported previously (Barðdal, 2008 ; Bowerman & Choi, 2001 ; Bybee, 1985 Bybee, , 1995 Clausner & Croft, 1997 ; Goldberg, 1995 ; Janda, 1990 ; Tomasello, 2003 ; Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007 ) .
Thus the notion of c o v e r a g e is a way of combining the well-supported and independently recognized factors of type frequency, variability, and similarity of a potential coinage to attested exemplars. Support for the notion of coverage comes from Perek ( 2016 ) , who investigates the nature of productivity over time by examining the 'V the hell out of NP' construction exemplifi ed in (18).
(18) Santas that would scare the hell out of Jesus. (Google) He examines the semantic distribution of verbs used in the construction in each of four 20-year time periods between 1930 and 2009, using distributional semantics and multidimensional scaling on the attested verbs found in COHA (Davies, 2008b ). Perek's results demonstrate that the degree of density of a semantic cluster during one period strongly correlates with how many new verbs are added to the cluster in the following two decade time period. That is, clusters with higher density tend to attract near neighbors to their cluster, just as the notion of coverage predicts. 3 Fig. 4 . Type frequency and variability is the same as is represented in Figure 3 , and yet coverage is reduced because the potential coinage is less similar to the attested types.
[ 3 ] The role of token frequency and its interaction with type frequency requires much more study; I leave this issue aside for now (but see, e.g., Boyd & Goldberg, 2009 ; Bybee, 1985 Bybee, , 1995 Bybee, , 2010 Casenhiser & Goldberg, 2005 ; Desagulier, 2015 ; Ellis & Ferreira-Junior, 2009 ; Goldberg, Casenhiser, & Sethuraman, 2004 ; Hilpert, 2013 ; Madlener, 2015 ; McDonough & Nekrasova-Becker, 2014 ; Wonnacott et al., 2012 ) .
Categorization, as captured by the notion of coverage, thus allows for the fact that language is often productive within a circumscribed semantic, pragmatic, and phonological space. That is, coverage captures the idea that new uses of verbs must fi t, or be able to accommodate, the semantic, pragmatic, and phonological constraints of the constructions they appear in (Ambridge et al., 2009 ; Coppock, 2008 ; Goldberg, 1995 ; Gropen et al., 1989 ; Gropen, et al., 1991 ; Pinker, 1989 ) . Since speakers implicitly categorize instances of each construction, and thereby form generalizations about semantic, pragmatic, and phonological constraints, new expressions are judged to be well-formed to the extent that they satisfy the general constraints of the constructions involved.
At the same time, coverage is not suffi cient in itself to account for the actual distribution of acceptable and non-acceptable exemplars. Recalling the examples in Table 3 , it is clear that certain exemplars are ill-formed, even though they satisfy the general constraints on the constructions in question. That is, attested instances of the constructions involved appear to cover the similarity space that should include the examples in Table 3 , and yet these examples nonetheless sound odd to native speakers.
Statistical preemption: competition-dependent
learning How is it that children learn to avoid the unacceptable examples in Table 3 ? This question has bedeviled researchers for decades (Ambridge, Pine, & Rowland, 2012 ; Ambridge, Pine, Rowland, & Young, 2008 ; Ambridge et al., 2009 ; Baker, 1979 ; Braine, 1971 ; Bowerman, 1988 ; Goldberg, 1995 Goldberg, , 2006 Goldberg, , 2011a Pinker, 1989 ) . In this section, it is argued that a process of stat i st i c a l p r e e m pt i o n plays a key role (Clark, 1987 ; Foraker, Regier, Khetarpal, Perfors, & Tenenbaum, 2007 ; Goldberg 1993 Goldberg , 1995 Goldberg , 2006 Goldberg , 2011a Marcotte, 2005 ) . Statistical preemption is a particular type of indirect negative evidence g o l d b e r g that results from repeatedly hearing a formulation, B, in a context where one might have expected to hear a semantically and pragmatically related alternative formulation, A. Given this type of input, speakers recognize that B is the appropriate formulation in such a context, and implicitly learn that A is not appropriate.
Morphological preemption (or 'blocking') has long been familiar from morphology: went preempts goed , and feet preempts foots (Aronoff , 1976 ; Kiparsky, 1993 ; Rainer, 1988 ) . That is, children learn to produce feet instead of foots because they systematically hear feet every time the 'plural of foot ' is expressed. At the same time, in the case of phrasal constructions, the role of statistical preemption requires discussion, since, unlike feet and the potential foots , distinct phrasal constructions are virtually never semantically and pragmatically identical (Bolinger, 1977 ; Clark, 1987 ; Goldberg, 1995 ) . Since two constructions that are semantically related often happily co-occur with the same verb, some have argued that statistical preemption cannot be eff ective (Bowerman, 1996 ; Pinker, 1989 ) . Certainly, knowledge that the to -dative paraphrase is licensed for explain should not immediately preempt the use of the double-object construction, since a large number of verbs freely appear in both constructions (e.g., tell ).
But the fact that each construction has a distinct function can actually work in favor of statistical preemption. Consider the to -dative and doubleobject constructions. They have overlapping, but distinct, semantic and information structure properties in that many corpus and production studies have demonstrated that the double-object construction is preferred over the to -dative if the recipient argument is pronominal and the transferred entity is a lexical noun phrase (Arnold, Eisenband, Brown-Schmidt, & Trueswell, 2000 ; Bresnan, Cueni, Nikitina, & Baayen, 2007 ; Collins, 1995 ; Dryer, 1986 ; Erteschik-Shir, 1979 ; Givón, 1979 Givón, , 1984 Goldberg, 1995 Goldberg, , 2006 Green, 1974 ; Oehrle, 1975 ; Thompson, 1990 Thompson, , 1995 Wasow, 2002 ) . For instance, examples like (19) are vastly more common than those like (20). The diff erence between the double-object and todative constructions is subject to some dialect diff erences and gradability, yet it is possible to predict with high probability which construction will be preferred in a given context, for a given dialect (Bresnan & Ford, 2010 ; Bresnan & Hay, 2008 ) . Therefore learners will witness situations in which the double-object construction is expected for a given verb, because the relevant information structure suits the double-object construction at least as well as the to -dative. If, in these situations, the to -dative is systematically witnessed instead, the learner can of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/langcog.2016.17 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 54.70.40.11, on 15 Sep 2019 at 08:00:19, subject to the Cambridge Core terms infer that the double-object construction is not after all appropriate (Goldberg, 1995 (Goldberg, , 2006 (Goldberg, , 2011a . As Goldberg ( 2006 ) emphasizes, the process is necessarily statistical, because a single use of the to -dative could be due to an unrecognized factor that actually encourages the to -dative, or even to an error by the speaker. But if the to -dative is consistently heard in such contexts, statistical preemption will lead to an avoidance of the double-object construction in favor of the to -dative. More generally, because of the diff erence in function between two constructions, A and B, there will exist contexts in which A is at least as appropriate as B for a particular verb. If B is consistently witnessed instead, people can learn that A is not possible for that verb.
Statistical preemption of phrasal forms has been investigated experimentally in only a few studies. Brooks and colleagues have found that novel intransitive verbs that have been witnessed in the preemptive periphrastic causative construction are much less likely to be used in the simple transitive than those that have not (Brooks & Tomasello, 1999 ; Brooks, & Zizak 2002 ) . For example, if a child hears both The cow is chamming and Ernie's making the cow cham , they are less likely to respond to "What did Elmo do to the cow?" with Ernie chammed the cow (the causative), than they are if only the intransitive construction had been witnessed (Brooks & Tomasello, 1999 ) . It seems that hearing the novel verb used in the periphrastic causative construction provides a readily available alternative to the causative construction, statistically preempting the use of the latter (cf. also Tomasello, 2003 ) .
Another case of an unpredictable restriction involves certain adjectives such as afraid which resist prenominal attributive position (21a), despite the fact that near synonyms and phonologically analogous adjectives readily appear in this position (21b):
(21) a. ??the afraid boy b. the scared/aloof boy These a -adjectives begin with an unstressed schwa and can be morphologically segmented into a -plus a semantically related stem (e.g., a-live , a-sleep ). The distribution is motivated by the fact that the majority of a -adjectives historically were prepositional phrases and, as prepositional phrases, they could not be expected to appear prenominally. Like typical adjectives, a -adjectives are inseparable phonological units, modify nouns, can be conjoined with uncontroversial adjectives (22) and can appear after the verb seem (23):
(22) The man was quiet and afraid.
(23) The man seemed afraid/asleep.
Thus, since speakers are generally unaware of the historical facts, the question arises as to how the restriction can be learned. Boyd and Goldberg ( 2011 ) examined adult naturalistic productions of such adjectives in three experiments, all of which required participants to describe scenes in which one of two animals with diff erent adjective labels moved to a star. The experiments all included four classes of adjectives: real a -adjectives; nearly synonymous real non-a -adjectives; nonsense a -adjectives; and nonsense non-a-adjectives. The task resulted in either a relative clause or prenominal (attributive) use of the target adjective (e.g., (24) or (25)).
(24) Prenominal:
The sleepy/??asleep/?adax fox.
(judgments based on data from Experiment 1 of Boyd & Goldberg, 2011 ) (25) Relative clause:
The fox that's sleepy/asleep/adax.
The fi rst experiment established that real a -adjectives (e.g., asleep ) strongly disprefer prenominal use, relative to non-a adjectives (e.g., sleepy ). In addition, n o v e l a -adjectives (e.g., adax ) disprefer prenominal use relative to non-a adjectives (e.g., chammy ) to a signifi cant extent as well. This indicates that participants tentatively assimilate never-before-seen a -adjectives to the category of familiar a -adjectives. The real a -adjectives were much less likely to occur prenominally than the novel a -adjectives were, but it suggests that speakers can t e n tat i v e ly generalize a restriction to unwitnessed but similar exemplars. A second experiment investigated the role of statistical preemption. It was found that in fact witnessing two of the four novel a -adjectives used in a preemptive relative clause context just three times each dramatically decreased prenominal uses so that all four novel a -adjectives behaved indistinguishably from familiar a -adjectives in avoiding prenominal uses. Non-a -adjectives were unaff ected. This result is striking because it not only demonstrates the eff ectiveness of preemption, but it also demonstrates that speakers are able to generalize evidence gleaned from statistical preemption to other members of the same category.
A fi nal experiment showed that learners rationally disregard p s e u d opreemptive input. Speakers did not display an increased avoidance of prenominal uses when exposed to pseudo-preemptive contexts like (26), presumably because they rationally attributed adax 's appearance in the relative clause to the complex adjective (cf. (27)), rather than to adax . Productions in the last experiment patterned like those in the fi rst experiment where no preemptive context was provided. Fillers were used to obscure the goal of the experiment and to guard against the eff ects being a simple result of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/langcog.2016.17 of structural priming. Debriefi ng confi rmed that speakers were unaware of the manipulations (see Goldberg & Boyd, 2015 , Yang, 2015 , for further discussion).
Collectively, these experiments go some way toward establishing how speakers are able to learn arbitrary distributional restrictions in their language -i.e., how they learn what not to say. Learners categorize their input, tentatively generalizing restrictions to new members of a perceived category. Familiar formulations statistically preempt other formulations when the former are repeatedly witnessed instead of a hypothesized formulation. Providing evidence that speakers categorize restrictions, the second experiment demonstrated that speakers extended the information gained from preemptive contexts to other instances of the same category. At the same time, speakers use statistical preemption wisely: they are impressively adept at ignoring alternative formulations when those formulations can be attributed to some irrelevant factor.
The preemptive process, unlike the notion of conservatism via entrenchment, predicts that expressions like (13)-(16) would n o t be preempted by the overwhelmingly more frequent uses of pray , cough , swim , and snore intransitively because the expressions in (13)-(16) are not in competition with the intransitive uses. For example, the meanings of causing a change of state (28) and an involuntary intransitive action (29) would not be used in the same contexts:
(28) And he sneezed the house in! (Joseph Robinette, The trial of the big bad wolf ) (29) She sneezed.
The intriguing fi nding that high-frequency intransitive verbs (e.g., disappear NP ) are less acceptable when used causatively than low-frequency intransitive verbs (e.g., vanish NP ) is consistent with the idea that it is preemption that prevents overgeneralization, rather than the frequency of the verb per se. Note that the periphrastic causative of high-frequency verbs is more frequent than that of low-frequency verbs. In fact, a corpus search of the Corpus of Contemporary American English confi rms that (30) is more frequent than (31), by a factor of ten. Robenalt and Goldberg ( 2015 ) revisit the fi nding that lower-frequency verbs are more acceptable in novel constructions, relative to their baseline acceptability in familiar types of sentences. If it is preemptive expressions that lead to the novel uses of the verbs being judged unacceptable, rather than baseline expressions, we should not fi nd the same frequency eff ect for those novel expressions that do not have a readily available alternative. To see whether this prediction held, pairs of novel sentences were created, each involving both low-and high-frequency near-synonyms, with novelty confi rmed using the COCA corpus (Davies, 2008a ) . In a separate norming study, the sentence pairs were classifi ed into two groups according to whether there exists a readily available paraphrase. Specifi cally, if more than half of a group of naive participants suggested t h e s a m e paraphrase for a given sentence, the sentence was considered to have a competing alternative; if instead no single paraphrase was agreed upon by the majority of participants, the sentence was considered not to have a readily available competing alternative. For example, in response to (32), the majority of respondents suggested the same alternative: Natalie smacked the mosquito with a newspaper . On the other hand, in the case of (33), people instead proposed a wide variety of paraphrases, e.g., The magician was so fascinating the toddlers went into a trance; The magician entertained the toddlers and they became fascinated , etc.
(32) Natalie smacked a newspaper onto the mosquito. (33) The magician fascinated the toddlers into a trance.
Thus (32) has a readily available competing alternative and (33) does not.
Findings replicated the stronger dispreference for a novel use with a highfrequency verb relative to its lower-frequency counterpart, but only for those sentences with a competing alternative phrasing. That is, while smack is judged worse than swatted in the caused motion construction ( Natalie smacked/ swatted a newspaper onto the mosquito ), frequency had no eff ect on novel sentences that had no readily available alternative, such as (33) or (13)-(16). For example, despite the fact that fascinate is more frequent than enthrall , the sentence The magician fascinated the toddlers into a trance was not judged to be less acceptable than The magician enthralled the toddlers into a trance . Thus, when there is no consensus about a preferred way to phrase a sentence, verb frequency is not a predictive factor in a sentence's ratings. This result implies that speakers are not simply conservative overall -they are willing to extend familiar words in new ways, but they a r e conservative when a readily available alternative formulation already exists. When it does, the readily available formulation is preferred -and the strength of the preference varies with the frequency of the competing alternative. Thus witnessing exemplars of one construction and n o t exemplars of a competing construction can lead learners to judge the non-occurring form to be unacceptable. This is represented schematically in Figure 6 .
If a novel formulation is not in competition with a familiar formulation, additional evidence of the familiar formulation does not weigh against the use of the novel formulation ( Figure 7 ) . of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10. 1017/langcog.2016.17 This is not to say that the degree of familiarity is irrelevant. Robenalt and Goldberg ( 2015 ) found that, overall, sentences in which verbs were used in their familiar argument structure pattern were strongly preferred over novel formulations, whether there existed a readily available alternative to the novel sentences or not (see also work by Ambridge and colleagues, e.g., Ambridge et al. 2012 ) . 4 We can thus summarize the results as follows. Speakers prefer to use the types of exemplars they have witnessed in Fig. 6 . Two competing constructions (competition indicated by the solid bar linking them). Attested instances on the right serve to statistically preempt the productive use on the left (indicated by the cross).
[ 4 ] Robenalt and Goldberg ( 2016 ) replicated this result in a separate group of native speakers, and also found that L2 learners only pattern with native speakers at the highest quartile of profi ciency. Possible factors that lead to the diff erence between L1 and lower profi ciency L2 speakers are explored in that paper. Fig. 7 . If there is no competition between two constructions, witnessing instances of one has no bearing on whether a novel instance of the other is judged acceptable. the input, but they are willing to extend constructions productively unless there exists a readily available alternative way of expressing the intended meaning.
3.1. m e c h a n i s m : c o m pe t i t i o n -d r i v e n l e a r n i n g There is a great deal of evidence that we often predict what others will say as they speak (e.g., Johnson, Turk-Browne, & Goldberg, 2013 ; Kutas & Hillyard, 1984 ; McRae, Spivey-Knowlton, & Tanenhaus, 1998 ; Garrod, 2007 , 2013 ; Stephens, Silbert, & Hasson, 2010 ; Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995 ) . When speakers anticipate a particular construction, we can assume that the construction is pa r t i a l ly a c t i vat e d . Intriguingly, it turns out that if one representation is partially activated, but a competing form is accessed instead, the partially activated form is subsequently harder to retrieve. This is true at the level of individual neurons: strong excitatory input leads to long-term synaptic strengthening, but m o d e r at e excitatory input leads to long-term synaptic weakening (Artola, Brocher, & Singer, 1990 ) . Behaviorally, too, partial activation of a competing form leads to learned dissociation (Anderson, Green, & McCulloch 2000 ; Anderson & Spellman, 1995 ; Kim, Lewis-Peacock, Norman, & Turk-Browne, 2014 ; Newman & Norman, 2010 ; Norman, Newman, & Detre, 2007 ; Storm & Levy, 2012 ) . The eff ect, often referred to as r e t r i e va l i n d u c e d f o r g e t t i n g , has been demonstrated, for example, in the following type of paradigm. Anderson and Spellman ( 1995 ) had a group of subjects learn paired associations, e.g., Fruit-Apple, Fruit-Pear, Fruit-Kiwi, Furniture-Table, Sport-tennis, Furniture-Chair, and so on. Participants were then provided incomplete cues in order to retrieve a subset of these pairs. For instances, one incomplete cue had the form:
(34) Fruit-Pe___.
Note that since 'Pear' is only partially cued in (34), subjects can be expected to partially activate other prototypical associates of Fruit, e.g., Apple. Retrievalinduced forgetting predicts that the partial activation and subsequent suppression of Fruit-Apple in favor of Fruit-Pear will lead to worse memory for Fruit-Apple. In fact, Anderson and Spellman found that subjects' memory for Fruit-Apple was weakened when compared with witnessed pairs that had not been partially activated, such as Sport-Tennis. The suppression only held for pairs such as Fruit-Apple that involved prototypical exemplars of the superordinate category (here, Fruit), because non-prototypical exemplars are less strongly associated with the category. As expected, then, memory for Fruit-Kiwi was not weakened. Retrieval-induced forgetting predicts that a construction that is in competition will be weakened whenever another form 'wins' (is used). For example, if, whenever a double-object pattern with explain , as in (35), is expected, (36) is repeatedly and consistently witnessed instead, (35) will become harder to retrieve. In this way, (36) will come to preempt (35). Goldberg ( 2011a ) , the probability of a construction CxB statistically preempting CxA for a particular verb, verb i , is:
(37) P(CxB | context suitable for CxA, and verb i. )
For example, if we assume that explain does not readily occur in the doubleobject construction because it is statistically preempted by the to -dative construction, we predict the probability in (38) to be high:
(38) P(dative | context suitable for the double-object construction and explain )
In order to operationalize how to count 'contexts that are at least as suitable for the double-object construction', we can use the total number of doubleobject and to -dative uses in a given corpus, when the semantics and information structure of the double-object construction are satisfi ed. That is, (39) P(dative | context suitable for double-object construction and verb i. ) ≈ P(dative | verb i. and (dative with relevant restrictions or double-object construction))
In fact, this probability has been estimated to be quite high (.99) on the basis of a corpus analysis (Goldberg, 2011a ) . Also relevant is the frequency with which the preempting situation is witnessed. That is, suppose that the fi rst time a learner hears explain , she expects to hear it used in the double-object construction, but instead hears it used in the to -dative. At that moment, the probability of witnessing explain in a preemptive context is 1, but only a single case has been witnessed. Clearly, the learner should not infer from a single exposure that the double-object construction is preempted for explain . On the other hand, if a learner hears explain used datively 100 times, without ever hearing it used in the double-object construction, the probability hasn't changed -it is still 1 -but the c o n f i d e n c e of preemption should be increased. In fact, it has been demonstrated experimentally that essentially a gap is more likely to be considered to be nonaccidental when the overall token frequency is increased ( Reeder, Newport, & Aslin, 2013 ; Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007 ) . We can observe further that it is not likely that confi dence increases linearly with frequency, so we appeal to the logarithmic function. Thus we can separate the two factors that determine the strength of preemption as follows: Probability (40), and Confi dence (41):
(40) Probability of CxB statistically preempting CxA for verb i : P(CxB| contexts in which CxA would be suitable) (41) Confi dence of statistical preemption for verb i , where F=frequency: ln F(CxB when CxA would be suitable)
Conclusion
Constructions are typically partially but not fully productive. The present paper sketches the two complementary factors: dy na m i c c at e g o r i z at i o n and stat i st i c a l p r e e m pt i o n . Much more work is needed to provide a fully comprehensive and explicit account (see Goldberg & Ambridge, forthcoming) , but it is clear that, as learners record statistics of their language, they dynamically categorize their input on the basis of form and function. Productivity is to a large extent determined by coverage, which is a general principle of induction: essentially, a potential new coinage is judged acceptable to the extent that the formal linguistic category it would join is well attested by similar exemplars. This idea captures the fact that each construction has a restricted range of distribution, typically dependent on various semantic, pragmatic, and phonological properties of the exemplars that are witnessed.
Recognizing that categories do not exist in isolation from one another, it is also important to recognize a process of statistical preemption whereby learners learn to avoid using one construction, even when the construction's constraints would seem to be satisfi ed, if an alternative formulation has been systematically witnessed instead. The mechanism required for statistical preemption is competition-driven learning, which is a domain-general process. When two competitors are activated, but one systematically wins, the loser becomes less accessible over time. In this way, with a recognition of both general properties of categorization and the role of competition among categories, we can begin to e x p l a i n o u r s e lv e s t h e pa r a d o x o f pa r t i a l p r o d u c t i v i ty . r e f e r e n c e s Ambridge , B. , Pine , J. M. , & Lieven , E. V . ( 2015 ) . Explanatory adequacy is not enough: response to commentators on 'Child language acquisition: why universal grammar doesn't help' . Language , 91 ( 3 ), e116 -e126 . Ambridge , B. , Pine , J. M. , & Rowland , C. F . ( 2012 ) . Semantics versus statistics in the retreat from locative overgeneralization errors . Cognition , 123 ( 2 ), 260 -279 . Ambridge , B. , Pine , J. M. , Rowland , C. F. , & Chang , F . ( 2012 ) . The roles of verb semantics, entrenchment and morphophonology in the retreat from dative argument structure overgeneralization errors . Language , 88 ( 1 ), 45 -81 .
